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Sunto: Secondo il paper di Sergio Salvatore Psychology as science of the explanandum, eè  assolutamente necessarioun linguaggio rigoroso per l’explanandum  in psicologia.  Questo atteggiamento eè  cioè  che Sergio Salvatorechiama  “psicologia  in  bianco  e  nero”.  Nel  presente  lavoro  mostriamo  come  il  metodo  epistemologicodell’esplicazione  possa  essere  uno  strumento  utile  alla  chiarificazione  concettuale  dei  termini  presentinell’explanandum  di una spiegazione psicologica. Due forme di esplicazione vengono presentate, l’esplica-zione secondo Carnap e l’esplicazione secondo Kant. Diversamente dall’esplicazione secondo Carnap, l’espli-cazione secondo Kant non richiede necessariamente un processo di formalizzazione e, per questa ragione,puoè  essere piuè  adeguata nel chiarificare termini psicologici complessi (eventualmente difficili da formalizza-re). Tuttavia, la formalizzazione in psicologia puoè  svolgere un ruolo molto importante. Astraendo da alcuniaspetti della ‘realtaè ’ (ad esempio, da alcuni dei suoi colori) eè  possibile chiarificare meglio la struttura profon-da della realtaè  (quella in bianco e nero). Attraverso una rigorosa metodologia epistemologica possiamo per-sino immaginare, usando nuovamente la metafora dei colori di Sergio Salvatore, di vedere la realtaè  in sfuma-ture di grigio. 
Parole chiave: Sergio Salvatore, spiegazione, esplicazione, modelli in psicologia Abstract: According to Sergio Salvatore’s Psychology as science of the explanandum, there is an urgent needof a rigorous language for the explanandum in psychology. This attitute is what Salvatore calls “psychology inblack and white”. In this paper, we point out that the epistemological method of explication may be a goodtool for the conceptual clarification of the terms that may work as the explanandum in a psychological expla-nation.  Two forms of  explications are presented,  Carnap’s explication and Kant’s  explication.  Differentlyfrom Carnap’s explication, Kant’s explication does not necessarily require a process of formalization and, forthis reason, it may be much more suitable for clarifying complex psychological terms (possibly difficult to beformalized). Still, formalization in psychology can accomplish a very important task. Abstracting by some as-pects of ‘reality’ (e.g., by some of its colours) we can better elucidate the deeper structure of reality (in blackand white) and, with sound epistemological methods, we can even imagine (using again Sergio Salvatore’smetaphor of colours) to see reality in shades of grey. 
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1. Introduction 
It is quite uncommon to get acquainted with
a book whose introduction may be conceived
as intellectually stimulating as whole book in
itself; this is the case for the Introduction to
Sergio Salvatore’s book, Psychology in Black
and White.  The Project of a Theory-Driven
Science  (Salvatore, 2015). A slightly revised
version of the Introduction has been recently
published  in  this  journal  (Salvatore,  2016).
Sergio  Salvatore’s  book  aims  to  assess  the
epistemological  status of scientific psychol-
ogy, enriched in the last years by an increas-
ing number of research of empirical nature;
in virtues of that, Sergio Salvatore favours an
interdisciplinary perspective which falls  be-
tween  philosophy  of  science  and  empirical
research in order to elucidate epistemological
and methodological  presuppositions  of  psy-
chology. In the light of this, it is significant,
but at the same time provocative, the title of
the Introduction: ‘Psychology as the Science
of the Explanandum’, where he makes a clear
sweep of cliché concerning psychology as a
science and, consequently, the profession of
psychologist or psychotherapist. 
Salvatore’s Introduction contains  milestones
for (the epistemological discussion on) psy-
chology  and  its  conceptual  structure.  Such
conceptual milestones should be ‘grasped’ all
together in order to properly understand their
effects and implications. It’s no doubt, such
milestones may constitute the basis for a con-
ceptual turn (an ‘epistemological rupture’ in
Bachelard’s  (1986)  terms),  for  a  view  and
practice of psychology as a scientific endeav-
our.  Such turn is  achieved not  from a  per-
spective  which  falls  outside  science,  but
within the most recent developments of psy-
chology. Salvatore’s idea of ‘Psychology as a
Theory-Driven  Science’ enables  him  to  re-
consider, in black and white, the scientific di-
mension of psychology together with its re-
cent history. 
A first  and  fundamental  issue  is  the  reap-
praisal of the conceptual dimension of psy-
chology, which is nowadays a minor topic in
psychology  compared  to  extremely  reduc-
tivist and empirical views on current psycho-
logical  research.  This  allows  Salvatore  to
provide  a  pars  destruens  in  order  to  make
psychology free from a perspective of blind
empiricism,  following  the  lack  of  critical
epistemological reflection. In virtues of this,
Salvatore’s paper underlines the necessity of
an  epistemic  discontinuity  with  common
sense,  which  has  been  the  implicit  back-
ground for traditional psychological research.
The  connection  between  psychological  re-
search and common sense can be viewed as
an “epistemological obstacle” in the sense of
Gaston Bachelard, causing an uncritical (and
empirical)  attitude and avoiding a ‘progres-
sive conceptualization’ (in the sense of Rie-
mann)  and  abstraction  as  in  physical  and
mathematical sciences. 
Another related topic is the radical critic of
ingenuous realism,  which assumes common
sense and the fundamental criterion for a cer-
tain psychological knowledge and constitutes
the conceptual knowledge of its own ‘object’.
Psychological  knowledge  in  itself  must  be
methodologically distant from the ‘real’ ob-
ject in order to scientifically grasp it at differ-
ent levels and articulations, as it happens to
be in other sciences, e.g., economy and other
historical and social sciences, in which theo-
retical  objects  work  as  powerful  heuristic
tools. This is exactly what Ludwig Boltzman
called  at  the  end  of  the  XIX  century  the
power of theoretical objects. The necessity of
such  power  is  urgently  invocated  for  psy-
chology by Salvatore.  Psychology, as every
science,  must  be able  to  create  theories  to-
gether with models in order to better know its
own  object(s)  of  investigation,  free  from
common  sense  definitions.  Theories  plus
models are required in order to handle empir-
ical data in a sound way and to insert them in
a theoretical framework with regulative crite-
ria and constraints. 
According to Salvatore,  a theory-driven ap-
proach is necessary: (i)  to provide a higher
level of epistemic consistency to psychology,
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(ii) to give psychology a remarkable level of
autonomy, (iii) to enhance the understanding
of the psychological dimension of knowing
processes. Moreover, a theory-drive approach
enables psychology to develop an appropriate
scientific language within which its ‘objects’
receive a rigorous meaning, which turns out
to be very different from the ingenuous (and
corrispondentist)  views  of  common  sense.
This amounts to be what Salvatore calls  “a
Copernican shift: the change from an empiri-
cal  science,  as  contemporary  psychology
self-represents itself, into a model-based sci-
ence”, in the face of the radical anti-empiri-
cal  turn  due  to  a  Theory-Driven  approach.
Being a scientist with key philosophical in-
sights, Salvatore does not merely devote his
efforts in the construction of the scientific ba-
sis  of  a  theory,  but  he  articulates  also  a
process of conceptual clarification in order to
understand the epistemological and ontologi-
cal implications of his work in psychology. 
The  pars  construens  of  Salvatore’s  ‘episte-
mological rupture’ shows its main and impor-
tant role in a considerable change for the un-
derstanding of many aspects of the epistemic
structure  of  psychology.  Psychology should
be shaped by a model-based ‘logic’ in order
to  interpret  human  experience  according  to
its  cognitive  sense.  Few models  have  been
proposed in time by various researchers (see,
for example, classic Sperling’s (1960) model
of short-term retention of visual verbal mate-
rial). 
It seems that a theory-driven approach may
help us to understand human experience. In
the  light  of  this,  Salvatore  holds  the  thesis
that psychology should not only take care of
the  explanans  (what explains a certain phe-
nomenon),  but  it  should attempt to  provide
conceptual  changes,  that  is,  it  should  be  a
science  of  the  explanandum  (what  must  be
explained). The meaning associated with the
explanandum  cannot  be  simply  decided  by
common sense. On the contrary, psychology
must become a science of sense-making, with
the implementation of formal  tools  and ab-
ductive  and  ampliative  forms  of  reasoning.
This  seems to  be  the  main  challenging but
fascinating  task  of  Sergio  Salvatore’s  psy-
chology as the science of the explanandum.
In the next Sections, we will suggest – using
Salvatore’s  metaphor  –  that  a  further  step
may be a shift from “a psychology in black
and  white”  to  a  “psychology  in  shades  of
grey”, in which colours are abstracted using a
rigorous  epistemology,  still  the  shades  of
grey (composed by the combination of black
and white components) help us to differenti-
ate the main colours. Section 2 compares Sal-
vatore’s  views  on  meaning  clarification  in
science and the methodology of explication.
Concluding epistemological remarks are ex-
pressed in Section 3. 
2. Explication and the attempts of ex-
planation in psychology 
As  analytically  remarked  by  Sergio  Salva-
tore,  explanations  play  an  essential  role  in
science  and  in  psychology.  He  argues  that
psychology cannot be easily reduced to the
evidence-based approach and underlines the
fruitfulness of an essential use of the method-
ology of explanation in science and psychol-
ogy. The nature of explanation in psychology
is a delicate issue, since it is not clear if it is a
functional (teleological), nomological-deduc-
tive, or statistically inductive type of expla-
nation. 
There are different types of scientific expla-
nations. Salvatore’s views seem to have some
flavours  of  the  functional  (teleological)  ac-
count of explanations, since he underlines the
relation  between  the  explanandum  and  the
goals  of a psychological  construct.  What is
more interesting is, however, Salvatore’s in-
quiry  into  the  problem  of  the  relation  be-
tween  the  language  of  common  sense  and
scientific  explanations  in  science.  This  is
usually adopted in defining the explanandum,
whereas the language used for the explanans
is  much  more  influenced  by  the  language
used in psychology or in a specific psycho-
logical theory. Still, the language of common
sense  affects  psychological  language  at  the
level of explanandum, that is, at the level of
the phenomenon to be explained. Given the
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ambiguities  associated  to  the  language  of
common sense, if a certain level of opacity
affects the meaning of the explanandum, then
a certain level of ambiguity may still remain
associated with the explanans. This is a very
key issue, as acknowledged by Sergio Salva-
tore. Indeed, according to Salvatore, psychol-
ogy  should  become  the  science  of  the  ex-
planandum,  meaning that also the language
used for the  explanandum has to be analyti-
cally  ‘constructed’ within  the  rigorous  lan-
guage of psychology, as it happens to be for
instance for natural sciences. 
The problem of providing a clarification of
the language used in the process of explana-
tion in science is not a new one and, as we
will  see,  it  has  an interesting  philosophical
tradition.  It  is  not  very easy to  construct  a
scientific explanantion when the terminology
used specifically at the level of the explanan-
dum is not rigorous but open to ambiguities.
Before the construction of an explanation it is
convenient to provide a meaning clarification
of the terms involved in it, even the terms be-
longing to the language of common sense. In
its more rigourous form, this meaning clarifi-
cation of the terms that may be used in a sci-
entific  explanation is  called  explication.  An
explication is a procedure of theoretical clari-
fication  of  an  inexact  prescientific  concept,
the explicandum, with a precise and scientific
concept, the  explicatum, so that the  explica-
tum must be: 
i) Similar to the explicandum; 
ii)  More exact and informative than the  ex-
plicandum; 
iii) Simple in order to be easily formalised; 
Moreover, 
iv)  an  explication  connects  the  explicatum
with a rigorous system of scientific concepts
(Carnap, 1950). 
As pointed out by Carnap, there is the need
to avoid the ambiguities of natural language
by  trying  to  substitute  the  vague  notion
present in the explicandum with a more rigor-
ous and scientific one expressed in the expli-
catum. Once we have an explicatum, then we
can use it subsequently within the process of
scientific explanation. In other words, scien-
tific  explanation requires meaning clarifica-
tion  or  even  a  complete  explication.  Of
course,  the  explicandum  is  not  equivalent
with  the  explicatum  under  all  aspects  (we
might say that we cannot see some colours of
the  explicandum), but still it  should express
the core meaning of the  explicatum (making
clearer the theoretical structure of the  expli-
catum). In this way, imprecise notions can be
ruled out in the scientific discourse in order
to  avoid  ambiguities  in  scientific  explana-
tions. For instance, rather than talking of the
qualitative “confirmation” of a theory, it may
be possible  to  substitute  this  notion  with  a
more precise notion of “degree of probabilis-
tic  confirmation”  of  a  theory  within  the
framework of probability calculus. However,
the  explication  procedure  has  an  intimate
connection  with  formalization.  Therefore,
one might argue that not all aspects of psy-
chological  theory  can  be  formalized  and
therefore the explication procedure is inade-
quate in psychology. Even if many attempts
to use formalization are nowadays very com-
mon in psychology, and also Sergio Salvatore
seems  to  be  sympathetic  with  this  view,
nonetheless it is possible to use explication in
a weaker sense in psychology. Such a weaker
sense is provided by Kant in “The Discipline
of  Pure  Reason  in  Its  Dogmatic  Employ-
ment” within the Transcendental Doctrine of
Method  of  the  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft
(Kant, 1965). For a fundamental analysis of
the Kantian account of explication, see (Bo-
niolo, 2003). Kantian explication is a process
of meaning clarification of a vague concept
that does not necessarily require any formal-
ization,  but  still  it  relies  on a rigorous lan-
guage.  In  both  senses  of  explication,  the
complex and vague aspects of the meaning of
scientific terms are reduced to their more ob-
jective and central meaning, i.e., all colours
are reduced to white and black.  Still,  using
again  Salvatore’s  metaphor  on  colours,  we
might say that Carnap’s explication sees the
world as black and white, Kant’s explication
sees the world in shades of grey. Both types
of explication are, thus, basically attempts of
meaning  reductionism.  However,  we  argue
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that a Kantian view on the explication of the
terms of contemporary psychology may, on
the one hand, clarify and recognize a rigor-
ous dimension of psychological knowledge,
contrary  to  many  extremely  postmodernist
views. On the other hand, it may ensure the
ideographic nature of psychological and clin-
ical knowledge, which cannot be completely
handled by extreme forms of reductionism as
it  happens  to  be,  for  instance,  in  the  evi-
dence-based approach. The interplay between
epidemiologic (population-based knowledge)
and clinical knowledge is a key issue also in
other  fields of  clinical  practice,  specifically
for  diagnostication  and  prognostication
((Chiffi  and  Zanotti,  2015,  2016,  2017a,
2017b),  Zanotti  and  Chiffi  (2015,  2016a,
2016b), Giaretta and Chiffi (2013)). As sug-
gested by Sergio Salvatore, it is worth noting,
however, that the elucidation of some prob-
lems of the evidence-based approach in psy-
chology  does  not  imply  the  abuse  of  intu-
ition, common sense and the systematic vio-
lation of clinical guidelines. 
3. Concluding Remarks 
In this short essay, a critical analysis of Ser-
gio Salvatore’s idea of psychology as a sci-
ence  of  the  explanandum  has  been pointed
out. We have outlined the benefits of consid-
ering psychology as a theory-driven science,
in which population-based knowledge is very
unlikely to be  directly  applied to a specific
clinical context, because of the emergent fea-
tures on the clinical encounter. Theories and
models should indicate how to relate popula-
tion-based  evidence  with  specific  clinical
cases  in  order  to  provide  person-centered
care (Miles and Loughlin, 2011). We strongly
agree on the relevance of using theories, ex-
planations and models in psychology. Unfor-
tunately,  as  remarked  by  Sergio  Salvatore,
many current psychological models incorpo-
rate the view that the explanandum has to be
defined  by  means  of  the  language  used  in
common  sense.  According  to  Salvatore
(2015, 2016), there is an urgent need of a rig-
orous language for the  explanandum in psy-
chology. We have pointed out that the episte-
mological  method  of  explication  may  be  a
good tool for the conceptual clarification of
the terms that may work as the explanandum
in  a  psychological  explanation,  especially
when we aim to investigate the mechanisms
behind the explanation. Two forms of expli-
cations have been presented, Carnap’s expli-
cation  and  Kant’s  explication.  Differently
from Carnap’s explication, Kant’s explication
does not necessarily require a process of for-
malization  and,  for  this  reason,  it  may  be
much  more  suitable  for  clarifying  complex
psychological terms (possibly difficult to be
formalized). Still, formalizations in psychol-
ogy  can  accomplish  a  very  important  task.
Abstracting by some aspects of reality (e.g.,
some colours of reality) we can better eluci-
date the deeper structure of reality (in black
and white). However, the subtle distinctions
and the process  of  meaning clarification  of
explication may enable us to see more differ-
ences in colours rather than black or white. It
follows  the  necessity  of  a  psychology  in
shades of grey.  
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